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Requiring Active Choosing Is A Form of Paternalism 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
Abstract 
Many people insist on drawing a line between active choosing and paternalism, 
but that line is often illusory. Whenever private or public institutions override 
people’s desire not to choose, and insist on active choosing, they are likely to be 
behaving paternalistically, through a kind of choice-requiring paternalism. 
Active choosing can be seen as a form of libertarian paternalism if people are 
permitted to opt out of choosing in favor of a default (and in that sense not to 
choose). This is a distinctive approach – “simplified active choosing” – and in 
many contexts, it has considerable appeal. By contrast, active choosing is a 
form of nonlibertarian paternalism insofar as people are required to choose. 
These points have implications for a range of issues in law and policy, 
suggesting that those who favor active choosing, or insist on it, may well be 
overriding people’s preferences (for better or for worse). 
 
I.  Choices and Default Rules 
 
Consider the following problems: 
 
1. A private company is deciding among three options: to enroll people 
automatically in a health insurance plan; to make them opt in if they like; or 
to say that as a condition for starting work, they must indicate whether they 
want health insurance, and if so, which plan they want. 
 
2. A utility company is deciding whether to adopt for consumers a “green default,” 
with a somewhat more expensive but environmentally preferable energy 
source, or instead a “gray default,” with a somewhat less expensive but 
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  Robert  Walmsley  University  Professor,  Harvard  University.  I  am  grateful  to  Elizabeth  Emens,  Eric 
Johnson, George Loewenstein, Eric Posner, Riccardo Rebonato, Lucia Reisch, and Adrian Vermeule for 
valuable comments on a previous draft. I am also grateful to participants in a legal theory workshop at Yale 
Law School and to audiences at Dartmouth College for excellent suggestions and to Matthew Lipka for 
superb comments and research assistance. Much of the material presented here appears, in earlier form, in a 
much  longer  essay,  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Choosing  Not  To  Choose  (2014),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377364; the goal of this essay is to present a simple, 
self-contained version of a central argument in that longer paper.  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400532 
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environmentally less desirable energy source, or alternatively to ask 
consumers which energy source they prefer. 
 
3. A social network site is deciding whether to adopt a system of default settings 
for privacy, or whether to require first-time users to say, as a condition for 
access to the site, what privacy settings they would prefer. 
 
In these cases, and countless others, an institution is deciding whether to use some 
kind of default rule or instead to require some kind of active choice. (I shall say a good 
deal about what the word “require” might mean in this setting.) For those who reject 
paternalism and who prize freedom of choice, active choosing has evident appeal. 
Indeed it might seem far preferable to any kind of default rule. 
 
In recent years, there have been vigorous debates about freedom of choice, 
paternalism, behavioral economics, individual autonomy, and the use of defaults.
1 
Invoking recent behavioral findings, some people have argued that because human 
beings err in predictable ways, and cause serious problems for themselves, some kind 
of paternalism is newly justified, especially if it preserves freedom of choice, as 
captured in the idea of “libertarian paternalism.”
2 Others contend that because of those 
very errors, some form of coercion is required to promote people’s welfare, and that the 
argument for choice-denying or nonlibertarian paternalism is much strengthened.
3  
 
These claims have been sharply contested. A possible response is that public 
officials are prone to error as well, and hence an understanding of behavioral biases 
argues against paternalism, not in favor of it.
4 The “knowledge problem” potentially 
affects all decisions by government,
5 and behavioral findings seem to compound that 
problem, because they suggest that identifiable biases will accompany sheer ignorance. 
The emerging field of “behavioral public choice” draws attention to that possibility.
6 It 
might also be objected that on grounds of both welfare and autonomy, active choosing 
is desirable even if people have a tendency to err.
7 On this view, people should be asked 
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 See,  e.g.,  SARAH  CONLY,  AGAINST  AUTONOMY  (2012);  RICHARD  H.  THALER  &  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Ryan Bubb & Richard 
Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Colin 
Camerer  et  al.,  Regulation  for  Conservatives:  Behavioral  Economics  and  the  Case  for  Asymmetric 
Paternalism, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law 
and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 1033 (2012); 
Riccardo  Rebonato,  A  Critical  Assessment  of  Libertarian  Paternalism  (2012),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346212. 
2
 See Camerer et al., supra note; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
3
 See CONLY, supra note; Bubb and Pildes, supra note. 
4
 See Edward Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006). 
5
 Friedrich Hayek, The Uses of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519 (1945). 
6
 See Jan Schnellenbach and Christian Schubert, Behavioral Public Choice: A Survey (2014), available at 
papers.ssrn.com.sol3/papers.cfm>abstract_id=2390290 
7
 See Wright and Ginsburg, supra note. 	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or allowed to choose, whether or not they would choose rightly. For all sides, the 
opposition between paternalism and active choosing seems stark and plain, and indeed 
it helps to define all of the existing divisions. 
 
 My central goal here is to unsettle that opposition and to suggest that it is often 
illusory. In many contexts, an insistence on active choosing is a form of paternalism, 
not an alternative to it. The central reason is that some people choose not to choose.
8 
Sometimes they make that choice explicitly (and indeed are willing to pay a 
considerable amount to people who will choose for them). They have actively chosen 
not to choose.  
 
Sometimes people have made no explicit choice; they have not actively chosen 
anything. But it is nonetheless reasonable to infer that in particular contexts, their 
preference is not to choose, and they would say so if they were asked. They might fear 
that they will err. They might be aware of their own lack of information
9 or perhaps 
their own behavioral biases (such as unrealistic optimism
10). They might find the 
underlying questions confusing, difficult, painful, and troublesome -- empirically, 
morally, or otherwise. They might not enjoy choosing. They might be busy and lack 
“bandwidth.”
11 They might not want to take responsibility for potentially bad outcomes 
for themselves (and at least indirectly for others).
12 They might anticipate their own 
regret and seek to avoid it.
13 
 
But even when people prefer not to choose, many private and public institutions 
favor and promote active choosing on the ground that it is good for people to choose. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8
 An important clarification: My focus throughout is not on “not choosing,” which involves no choice at all, 
and which is different from choosing not to choose, in the sense of choosing someone else to choose on 
one’s behalf. One might not choose because (for example) of procrastination or because one wants to retain 
option value. See Ziv Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like 
Losing, 30 J. CONST. RES. 15 (2003). There is, of course, an overlap between the two phenomena: People 
might decline to choose because they are busy, do not want to take responsibility, or think that they might 
err. But choosing not to choose is a form of choice, and those who want to avoid choosing might be as 
adverse to that choice as any other. 
9
 On the effects of lack of information in producing abstention, see Tom Coupe & Abdul Noury, Choosing 
Not to Choose: On the Link Between Information and Abstention, 84 ECON. LETTERS 261 (2004). 
10
 See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN (2011). 
11
 See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY 39-66 (2013). 
12
 For a demonstration, see Bjorn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher,  Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and 
Responsibility, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 67 (2012). On people’s preference for flipping a coin, as a way of 
avoiding  responsibility,  see  Nadja  Dwengler  et  al.,  Flipping  A  Coin:  Theory  and  Evidence  (2013) 
(unpublished manuscript). Consider this suggestion, id. at 1:  The “cognitive or emotional cost of deciding 
may outweigh the benefits that arise from making the optimal choice. For example, the decision-maker may 
prefer not to make a choice without having sufficient time and energy to think it through. Or, she may not 
feel entitled to make it. Or, she may anticipate a possible disappointment about her choice that can arise 
after a subsequent resolution of uncertainty. Waiving some or all of the decision right may seem desirable 
in such circumstances even though it typically increases the chance of a suboptimal outcome.” 
13
 Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 51-54 
(1980). 	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To this extent, active choosing counts as paternalistic. To be sure, nanny states forbid 
choosing, but they also forbid the choice not to choose. Choice-requiring paternalism 
might be an attractive form of paternalism, but it is no oxymoron, and it is paternalistic 
nonetheless.  
 
If people are required to choose even when they would prefer not to do so, active 
choosing counts as a species of nonlibertarian paternalism in the sense that people’s 
own choice is being rejected. We shall see that in many cases, those who favor active 
choosing are actually mandating it, and may therefore be overriding (on paternalistic 
grounds) people’s choice not to choose.
14 When people prefer not to choose, required 
choosing is a form of coercion — though it may be the right form, at least where active 
choosing does not increase the likelihood and magnitude of errors, and where it is 
important to enable people to learn and to develop their own preferences.  
 
If, by contrast, people are asked whether they want to choose, and can opt out of 
active choosing (in favor of, say, a default rule), active choosing counts as a form of 
libertarian paternalism. In some cases, it is an especially attractive form. A company 
might ask people whether they want to choose the privacy settings on their computer, or 
instead rely on the default, or whether they want to choose their electricity supplier, or 
instead rely on the default.  
 
With such an approach, people are being asked to make an active choice between 
the default and their own preference, and in that sense, their liberty is fully preserved. 
Call this simplified active choosing. Simplified active choosing has the advantage of 
avoiding the kinds of pressure that come from a default rule,
15 while also allowing 
people to rely on such a rule if they like. In the future, we should see, and we should 
hope to see, adoption of this approach by a large number of institutions, both public and 
private. 
 
It is important to acknowledge, however, that whenever a private or public 
institution asks people to choose, it might be overriding their preference not to do so, 
and in that sense engaging in choice-requiring paternalism. This point applies even 
when people are being asked whether they want to choose to choose. After all, they 
might not want to make that second-order choice (and might therefore prefer a simple 
default rule). In this sense, there is a strong nonlibertarian dimension to apparently 
liberty-preserving approaches that ask people to choose between active choosing and a 
default rule. If these claims do not seem self-evident, or if they appear a bit jarring, it is 
because the idea of active choosing is so familiar, and so obviously appealing, that it 
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 There is an irony here in light of evidence that people sometimes place an excessive value on choice, in 
the sense that their preference for choice leads to welfare losses. See Simona Botti & Christopher Hsee, 
Dazed and Confused by Choice, 112 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 161 (2010). 
15
 See Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Decisions by Default, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
POLICY 417, 417-18 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (discussing impact of defaults).  	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may not be seen for what it is: a form of choice architecture, and one that many 
choosers may dislike, at least in settings that are unfamiliar or difficult.
16 
 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II explores how, and in 
what settings, active choosing might be required. Part III draws attention to choice-
requiring paternalism and shows that it is not a contradiction in terms. It explains that 
when people choose not to choose, active choosing counts as a form of paternalism, one 
that runs into both welfare-based and autonomy-based arguments in favor of freedom of 
choice (including the choice not to choose). This point holds even for simplified active 
choosing, though the standard objections to paternalism are weakened as applied to that 
approach. Part IV concludes. 
 
II. Varieties of Choice 
 
Many of those who embrace active choosing believe that consumers of goods and 
services, and indeed choosers of all sorts, should be free from government influence.
17 
Of course they recognize that in markets, producers will impose influences of multiple 
kinds, but they contend that when third parties are not affected, and when force and 
fraud are not involved, government should remain neutral. They reject paternalism on 
government’s part.
18 Perhaps it is legitimate for public officials to require the provision 
of accurate information, so as to ensure that consumer’s choices are adequately 
informed. But if government seeks to “nudge”
19 people in its preferred directions in 
other ways – by imposing default rules or embracing paternalism of any kind – it is 
exceeding its appropriate bounds. 
 
A. Three Possibilities 
 
But what does active choosing entail?
20 What does it mean to “require” people to 
indicate their preferences? Those who insist on the inevitability of default rules will 
object that there is no good answer to this question. Even if choice architects seek to 
promote active choosing, they have to specify what happens if people simply refuse to 
choose. Isn’t the answer some kind of default rule? 
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 A valuable discussion is presented in Barbara Fried, But Seriously, Folks, What Do People Want?, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1529 (2013). For discussion that bears on whether choice-requiring paternalism is justified, 
see Sunstein, Choosing Not To Choose, supra note, and Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding By Default, 162 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1 (2013), and in particular the discussion of learning over time. 
17
 This is the general thrust of Rebonato, supra note. 
18
 Id.; Wright & Ginsburg, supra note.  
19
 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note. 
20
 I am understanding the term in a purely formal sense, to capture a response to a question about what one 
prefers. It would be possible to understand “choosing” in a more functional sense, to capture deciding for 
reasons,  as  distinguishing  from  simply  “picking,”  which  is  akin  to  tossing  a  coin.  For  an  important 
discussion,  see  Edna  Ullmann-Margalit  &  Sidney  Morgenbesser,  Picking  and  Choosing,  44  SOCIAL 
RESEARCH 757 (1977). As I understand it here, active choosing includes “picking,” and can occur even 
when people lack an antecedent preference. 	 ﾠ 6 
The question is a good one, because some kind of default rule is ultimately 
necessary. Choice architects have to establish what happens if people decline to choose. 
But this point should not be taken to collapse the distinction between active choosing 
and default rules. To see why, consider three possibilities.  
 
(a)  Criminal or civil punishment for those who refuse to make an active choice. In 
most contexts, no one contends that if people fail to make a choice, they 
should be imprisoned or otherwise punished. The sanction for that failure 
is that they do not receive a good or service (see (b) and (c) below). But 
there are exceptions. In some nations, including Australia, Belgium, and 
(before 1970) the Netherlands, people have been subject to civil sanctions 
if they fail to vote,
21 and in that sense they may be punished for refusing to 
make an active choice. So too, the Affordable Care Act requires people to 
make a choice about health insurance, subject to punishment if they fail to 
do so.
22  
 
With respect to active choosing, both of these cases do have a wrinkle: 
People are being forced to choose along one dimension (for whom to vote 
and which health insurance plan to obtain), but are being prohibited from 
choosing along another dimension (whether to vote or to obtain health 
insurance). But insofar as one kind of choice is being required, we may 
fairly speak of coerced choosing.  
 
We could imagine other contexts in which people would face sanctions if 
they do not choose, though admittedly such cases look more like science 
fiction than the real world. Consider cases in which people must decide 
whether to become organ donors (or face criminal penalties) or must 
choose privacy settings on their computer (subject to civil sanctions if they 
do not). The fact that sanctions are rarely imposed on people who choose 
not to choose might be taken to suggest an implicit recognition that in a 
free society, such choices are generally acceptable and indeed a legitimate 
part of consumer sovereignty. One reason involves information: People 
know best what they want, and others should not choose for them, even if 
the choice is not to choose.
23 
 
(b)  Active choosing with respect to a related or ancillary matter as a condition 
for obtaining a good or a service (or a job). Sometimes active choosing is 
mandatory in a distinctive sense: Unless people make an active choice on 
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 Lisa Hill, Low Voter Turnout in the United States: Is Compulsory Voting A Solution, 18 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 207, 208 (2006). 
22
 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Note that by 2015, large employers will be required to adopt a form of 
automatic enrollment for health insurance. See 29 U.S.C. 218A. 
23
 For  a  powerful  demonstration,  see  Joel  Waldfogel,  SCROOGENOMICS:  WHY  YOU  SHOULDN’T  BUY 
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009) (showing that even family members and close friends make large 
mistakes in choosing for people during holiday season). 	 ﾠ 7 
some matter, they cannot obtain a good or service, even though that good 
or service, narrowly defined, is not the specific topic of the choice that they 
are being asked to make. We can imagine a continuum of connections 
between the matter in question, for which an active choice is being 
required, and the specific good that has already been chosen.  There would 
be a close connection if, for example, people were told that unless they 
indicate their preferences with respect to car insurance, they cannot rent a 
car. So too, there would be a close connection if people were told that 
unless they create a password, or indicate their preferences with respect to 
privacy settings, they cannot use their computer. And indeed, both of these 
cases are standard. In markets, sellers sometimes insist that purchasers 
must make an active choice on some related matter in order to obtain or 
use a product. 
 
By contrast, there would be a weaker connection if people were informed 
that they could not work with a particular employer until they have 
indicated their preferences with respect to their retirement plan. The 
connection would be weaker still if people were told that they could not 
obtain a drivers’ license unless they indicate their preferences with respect 
to organ donation. The connection would be even weaker if people were 
told that they could not register to vote unless they have made a choice 
about their preferred privacy settings on their computer.  
 
In the final two examples, there is not a tight connection between the 
matter on which people are being asked to make a choice and the good that 
they are specifically seeking.
24 In some cases, the choice architect is 
requiring an active choice on a matter that is genuinely ancillary. Note that 
in imaginable cases that fall in this category, the requirement of active 
choosing has a strongly coercive dimension insofar as the good in question 
is one that people cannot easily reject (such as a driver’s license, a job, or a 
right to vote). The choice architect is, in effect, leveraging that good to 
ensure an active choice on some other matter.  
 
From the normative point of view, we might want to distinguish between 
public and private institutions here. Perhaps private institutions, disciplined 
as they are by market forces, should freely compete along this dimension 
as along others, and perhaps public institutions should hesitate before 
requiring people to choose, unless there is a close connection between the 
good or service in question and the object of active choice. 
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 There is a counterargument in the case of organ donations. In 2007, for example, motor vehicle accidents 
accounted  for  about  20  percent  of  all  organ  donations.  See Stacy  Dickert-Conlin  et  al.,  Donorcycles: 
Motorcycle Helmet Laws and the Supply of Organ Donors, 54 J.L. & Econ. 907, 912 (2011). 
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(c)  Active choosing among goods, services, or jobs as a condition for obtaining a 
good, a service, or a job. For most consumption decisions, people are 
given a range of options, and they can choose one or more of them, or none 
at all. Unless they make a choice, they will not obtain the relevant good or 
service. They are not defaulted into purchasing tablets, cell phones, shoes, 
or fishing poles. Indeed, this is the standard pattern in free markets. When 
people visit a website, a restaurant, or a grocery or appliance store, they are 
generally asked to make an active choice. The default – understood as what 
happens if they do nothing – is that no product will be purchased. People 
do not receive goods or services unless they have actively chosen them. 
The same point holds for the employment market. People are not typically 
defaulted into particular jobs, at least not in any formal sense. They have a 
range of options, and unless they take one, they will be unemployed. In this 
respect, free markets generally require active choosing.  
 
There is nothing inevitable about this situation. We could imagine a 
situation in which sellers assume, or presume, that people want certain 
products, and in which buyers obtain them, and have to pay for them, 
passively. Imagine, for example, that a bookseller has sufficient 
information to know, for a fact, that Johnson would want to buy any new 
book by Stephen King, Amartya Sen, or Joyce Carol Oates, or that Smith 
would like to purchase a new version of a particular tablet, or that Smith 
would want to buy a certain pair of sneakers, or that when Williams runs 
out of toothpaste, he would like new toothpaste of exactly the same kind. If 
the sellers’ judgments are unerring, or even nearly so, would it be 
troublesome and intrusive, or instead a great benefit, for them to arrange 
the relevant purchases by default? Existing technology is increasingly 
raising this question.
25 
 
There is a good argument that the strongest reason to require active 
choosing is that reliable predictive shopping algorithms do not exist, and 
hence active choosing is an indispensable safeguard against erroneous 
purchases, and thus not in the interests of those who might be denominated 
purchasers (by default). On this view, the argument for active choosing is 
rooted in the view that affirmative consent protects against mistakes – 
which leaves open the possibility of “passive purchases” if and when a 
reliable technology becomes available. So long as such technology does 
not exist, passive purchases would be unacceptable.  
 
It is true that markets require a background set of entitlements, establishing 
what people have and do not have, before they begin to choose; the 
background entitlements are given rather than chosen, and they might 
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 See Greg Bensinger, Amazon Wants to Ship Your Package Before You Buy It, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2014, 
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reflect a form of paternalism. For example, people might have some kind 
of “default entitlement” to be free from age discrimination, which they can 
waive for a price
26; some entitlements of this kind (such as the right to be 
free from discrimination on the basis of race and sex) are not waivable.
27 
Because people’s preferences may be affected by decisions about 
background entitlements,
28 a form of paternalism may be difficult or 
perhaps impossible to avoid insofar as some person or institution is making 
those decisions.
29 If people’s preferences are an artifact of entitlements, we 
cannot select entitlements by asking about those preferences. But with 
background entitlements in place, people usually do not obtain goods or 
services unless they have actively chosen them (putting gifts to one side). 
 
B. Sellers As Choice Architects 
 
As the examples suggest, both private and public institutions might choose (b) or 
(c), though of course only government can choose (a). It should be clear that active 
choosing is far from inevitable. Instead of imposing active choosing, an institution 
might select some kind of default rule, specifying what happens if people do nothing. 
Of course (b) and (c) also come with a kind of default rule: unless people make an 
active choice, they will have no good, no service, and no employment. But other 
approaches are possible.  
 
For example, those who obtain driver’s licenses might be defaulted into being 
organ donors, or those who start work with a particular employer might be defaulted 
into a specific retirement or health care plan. Alternatively, those who make an active 
choice to purchase a particular product – say, a book or a subscription to a magazine – 
might be enrolled into a program by which they continue to receive a similar product on 
a periodic basis, whether or not they have not made an active choice to do that. The 
Book of the Month Club famously employs a strategy of this sort.
30  
 
An active choice to purchase a product might also produce a default rule that is 
unrelated to the product – as, for example, where purchase of a particular book created 
default enrollment in a health care plan, or where an active choice to enroll in a health 
care plan created default enrollment in a book club. In extreme cases, where disclosure 
is insufficiently clear, an approach of this kind might be a form of fraud, though we 
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 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2012).  
27
 See also, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) (holding that employees may not 
waive their rights to the minimum wage or overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
201-19). 
28
 See  Keith  M.  Marzilla  Ericson  &  Andreas  Fuster,  The  Endowment  Effect  (Nat’l  Bureau  of  Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 19384, 2013), available at www.nber.org/papers/w19384. 
29
 I am bracketing the possibility that entitlements are a product of a “spontaneous order” of some sort, 
rather than of any kind of decision. 
30
 See Peter Bowal, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 
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could also imagine cases in which such an approach would actually track people’s 
preferences.  
 
Suppose, for example, that a private institution knows that people who purchase 
product X (say, certain kinds of music) also tend to like product Y (say, certain kinds of 
books). Suggestions of various kinds, default advertisements, default presentations of 
political views, and perhaps even default purchases could be welcome and in people’s 
interests, unfamiliar though the link might seem. For example, the website Pandora 
tracks people’s music preferences, from which it can make some inferences about likely 
tastes and judgments about other matters, including politics.
31 
 
We could also imagine cases in which people are explicitly asked to choose 
whether they want to choose.
32 Consumers might be asked: Do you want to choose your 
cell phone settings, or do you want to be defaulted into settings that seem to work best 
for most people, or for people like you? Do you want to choose your own health 
insurance plan, or do you want to be defaulted into the plan that seems best for people 
in your demographic category? In such cases, many people may well decide in favor of 
a default rule, and thus decline to choose, because of a second-order desire not to do so. 
They might not trust their own judgment; they might not want to learn. The topic might 
make them anxious. They might have better things to do.  
 
Simplified active choosing – active choosing, with the option of using a default -- 
has considerable promise and appeal, not least because it avoids at least many of the 
influences contained in a default rule,
33 and might therefore seem highly respectful of 
autonomy while also giving people the ability to select the default. For cell phone 
settings or health insurance plans, active choosers can choose actively if they like, 
while others can (actively) choose the default.  
 
Note, however, that this kind of question is not quite a perfect solution, at least for 
those people who genuinely do not want to choose. After all, they are being asked to do 
exactly that. At least some of those people likely do not want to have to choose between 
active choosing and a default rule, and hence they would prefer a default rule to an 
active choice between active choosing and a default rule. Even that active choice takes 
time and effort, and imposes costs, and some or many people might not want to bother. 
In this respect, supposedly libertarian paternalism, in the form of an active choice 
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 For evidence to this effect, see Natasha Singer, Listen to Pandora, and It Listens Back, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
5, 2014, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/technology/pandora-mines-users-data-
to-better-target-ads.html?hpw&rref=technology&_r=2&,  and  consider  in  particular:  “During  the  next 
federal election cycle, for instance, Pandora users tuning into country music acts, stand-up comedians or 
Christian bands might hear or see ads for Republican candidates for Congress. Others listening to hip-hop 
tunes, or to classical acts like the Berlin Philharmonic, might hear ads for Democrats.” Id. 
32
 See Bartling et al., supra note, which shows that people will often say “yes,” other things being equal, 
thus supporting the conclusion that decision rights have intrinsic value. We can agree with that conclusion 
while also asserting that in some cases, the intrinsic value will be outweighed by the instrumental value of 
delegation (as, for example, where people believe they will err, or where people are busy). 
33
 See Rebonato, supra note. 	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between active choosing and a default, itself has a strong nonlibertarian dimension – a 
conclusion that brings us directly to the next section. 
 
III. Choice-Requiring Paternalism 
 
A. Paternalism, Welfare, Autonomy 
 
Is  active  choosing  paternalistic,  when  people  would  prefer  not  to  choose?  To 
answer that question, we have to start by defining paternalism. There is of course an 
immensely large literature on that question.
34 Let us bracket the hardest questions and 
note that while diverse definitions have been given, it seems clear that the unifying 
theme of paternalistic approaches is that a private or public institution does not believe 
that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps to influence or 
alter people’s choices for their own good.
35  
 
What  is  wrong  with  paternalism,  thus  defined?  Those  who  reject  paternalism 
typically invoke welfare, autonomy, or both.
36 They tend to believe that individuals are 
the best judges of what is in their interests, and of what would promote their welfare, and 
that outsiders should decline to intervene because they lack crucial information.
37 John 
Stuart Mill himself emphasized that this is the essential problem with outsiders, including 
government officials.  Mill insisted that the individual “is the person most interested in 
his  own  well-being,”
38 and  the  “ordinary  man  or  woman  has  means  of  knowledge 
immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else.”
39 When society 
seeks  to  overrule  the  individual’s  judgment,  it  does  so  on  the  basis  of  “general 
presumptions,” and these “may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not 
to be misapplied to individual cases.”
40 Mill’s goal was to ensure that people’s lives go 
well, and he contended that the best solution is for public officials to allow people to find 
their own path.
41 
 
This  is  an  argument  about  welfare,  grounded  in  a  claim  about  the  superior 
information held by individuals. But there is an independent argument from autonomy,
42 
which emphasizes that even if people do not know what is best for them, and even if they 
would choose poorly, they are entitled to do as they see fit (at least so long as harm to 
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 See,  e.g.,  PATERNALISM  (Christian  Coons  &  Michael  Weber  eds.,  2013);  GERALD  DWORKIN,  THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988). 
35
 For  a  valuable  and  relevant  discussion,  bearing  particularly  on  means  paternalism,  see  B.  Douglas 
Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral 
Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51 (2009). 
36
 Rebonato, supra note, is an especially helpful discussion. 
37
 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE MARKET AND OTHER ORDERS 384-86 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2014). 
38
 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Kathy Casey ed., 2002) (1859). 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. 
41
 See also HAYEK, supra note. 
42
 For a recent version, see Wright & Ginsburg, supra note. 	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others, or some kind of collective action problem, is not involved). On this view, freedom 
of choice has intrinsic and not merely instrumental value. It is an insult to individual 
dignity, and a form of infantilization, to eliminate people’s ability to go their own way.
43 
 
B. Choice-Requiring Paternalism 
 
Whether or not these objections to paternalism are convincing,
44 there are legitimate 
questions about whether and how they apply to people whose choice is not to choose. On 
reflection, they apply quite well, and so choice-requiring paternalism is no oxymoron. 
People might decline to choose for multiple reasons. They might believe that they lack 
information or expertise. They might fear that they will err. They might not enjoy the act 
of choosing; they might like it better if someone else decides for them. They might not 
want to incur the emotional costs of choosing, especially for situations that are painful or 
difficult to contemplate (such as organ donation or end-of-life care). They might find it a 
relief,
45 or even fun, to delegate. They might not want to take responsibility.
46 They might 
be too busy.
47 They might not want to pay the psychic costs associated with regretting 
their choice.
48 Active choosing saddles the chooser with responsibility for the choice, and 
reduces the chooser’s welfare for that reason. 
 
In  daily  life,  people  defer  to  others,  including  friends  and  family  members,  on 
countless  matters,  and  they  are  often  better  off  as  a  result.  In  ordinary  relationships, 
people benefit from the functional equivalent of default rules, some explicitly articulated, 
others not. Within a marriage, for example, certain decisions (such as managing finances 
or planning vacations) might be made by the husband or wife by default, subject to opt-
out in particular circumstances. That practice has close analogues in many contexts in 
which people are dealing with private or public institutions and choose not to choose. 
Indeed, people are often willing to pay others a great deal to make their choices for them. 
But even when there is no explicit payment or grant of the power of agency, people might 
well prefer a situation in which they are relieved of the obligation to choose, because 
such relief will reduce decision costs, error costs, or both. 
 
Suppose, for example, that Jones believes that he is not likely to make a good choice 
about his retirement plan, and that he would therefore prefer a default rule, chosen by 
someone who is a specialist in the subject at hand. In Mill’s terms: Doesn’t Jones know 
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 For an illuminating and skeptical discussion, suggesting that overriding choices need not entail a lack of 
respect, see CONLY, supra note. 
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 For  detailed  discussion,  see  id.;  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  WHY  NUDGE?  THE  POLITICS  OF  LIBERTARIAN 
PATERNALISM (2014). 
45
 For  related  discussion,  see  Edna  Ulmann-Margalit,  On  Not  Wanting  to  Know,  in  REASONING 
PRACTICALLY (Edna Ullmann-Margalit ed.,2000). 
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 See Dwengler et al., supra note, for an emphasis on delegation to a randomized process. 
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 See MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note. 
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 Thaler, supra note. But see Jeffrey R. Brown et al., The Downside of Defaults (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. 
Working Paper No. 12-05, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/aging/rrc/papers/onb12-05.pdf (finding 
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best?  Or  suppose  that  Smith  is  exceedingly  busy,  and  wants  to  focus  on  her  most 
important concerns, not on a question about the right health insurance plan for her, or 
even about the right privacy setting on her computer. Doesn’t Mill’s argument support 
respect for Smith’s choice? In such cases, the welfarist arguments seem to argue in favor 
of deference to the chooser’s choice, even if that choice is not to choose. If we believe in 
freedom of choice on the ground that people are uniquely situated to know what is best 
for them,
49 then that very argument should support respect for people when they freely 
choose not to choose. 
 
Or  suppose  that  Winston,  exercising  his  or  her  autonomy,  decides  to  delegate 
decisionmaking authority to someone else, and thus to relinquish the power to choose, in 
a context that involves health insurance, energy providers, privacy, or credit card plans. Is 
it an insult to Winston’s dignity, or instead a way of honoring it, if a private or public 
institution refuses to respect that choice? It is at least plausible to suppose that respect for 
autonomy requires respect for people’s decisions about whether and when to choose. 
That view seems especially reasonable in view of the fact that people are in a position to 
make countless decisions, and they might well decide that they would like to exercise 
their autonomy by focusing on their foremost concerns, not on what seems trivial, boring, 
or difficult.
50  
 
But are people genuinely bothered by the existence of default rules, or would they be 
bothered if they were made aware that such rules had been chosen for them? We do not 
have a full answer to this question; the setting, and the level of trust, undoubtedly matter. 
But note in this regard the empirical finding, in the context of end-of-life care, that even 
when they are explicitly informed that a default rule is in place, and that it has been 
chosen because it affects people’s decisions, there is essentially no effect on what people 
do – a finding that suggests that people are not uncomfortable with defaults, even when  
they are made aware that choice architects have selected them, and do so because of their 
significant effect.
51 
 
C. Freedom and its Alienation 
 
To be sure, we could imagine hard cases in which a choice not to choose seems to be 
an  alienation  of  freedom.  In  the  extreme  case,  people  might  choose  to  be  slaves  or 
otherwise to relinquish their liberty in some fundamental way.
52 In a less extreme case, 
people might choose not to vote, not in the sense of failing to show up at the polls, but in 
the  sense  of  (formally)  delegating  their  vote  to  others.  Such  delegations  are 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
49
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 See  George  Loewenstein  et  al.,  Warning:  You  Are  About  To  Be  Nudged  (2014)  (unpublished 
manuscript). 
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impermissible,
53 perhaps because they would undo the internal logic of a system of voting 
(in part by creating a collective action problem that a prohibition on vote-selling solves
54), 
but  perhaps  also  because  individuals  would  be  relinquishing  their  own  freedom.  Or 
perhaps  people  might  choose  not  to  make  choices  with  respect  to  their  religious 
convictions, or their future spouse,
55 and they might delegate those choices to others. In 
cases that involve central features of people’s lives, we might conclude that freedom of 
choice  cannot  be  alienated  and  that  the  relevant  decisions  must  be  made  by  the 
individuals themselves.  
 
It is a complex question which cases fall in this category.
56 But even if the category 
is fairly large, it cannot easily to taken as a general objection to the proposition that on 
autonomy grounds, people should be allowed not to choose in multiple domains. 
 
D. Justified Paternalism? 
 
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  choice  not  to  choose  may  not  be  in  the 
chooser’s  interest  (as  the  chooser  would  define  it).  For  that  reason,  choice-requiring 
paternalism  might  have  a  welfarist  justification.  Perhaps  the  chooser  chooses  not  to 
choose only because he lacks important information (which would reveal that the default 
rule might be harmful) or suffers from some form of bounded rationality. A behavioral 
market  failure  (understood  as  a  nonstandard  market  failure  that  comes  from  human 
error
57) might infect a choice not to choose, just as it might infect a choice about what to 
choose.  
 
A non-chooser might, for example, be unduly affected by “availability bias” because 
of an overreaction to a recent situation in which his own choice went wrong.
58 Or perhaps 
the chooser is myopic and is excessively influenced by the short-term costs of choosing, 
which might require some learning (and hence some investment), while underestimating 
the long-term benefits, which might be very large. A form of “present bias”
59 might infect 
the decision not to choose. People might face a kind of intrapersonal collective action 
problem, in which such a decision by Jones, at Time 1, turns out to be welfare-reducing 
for Jones at Times 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
 
But  for  those  who  reject  paternalism,  these  kinds  of  concerns  are  usually  a 
justification  for  providing  more  and  better  information  –  not  for  blocking  people’s 
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choices, including their choices not to choose. In these respects, the welfarist objections 
to paternalism seem to apply as well to those who insist on active choosing. Of course 
welfarists might be wrong to object to paternalism.
60 But with respect to their objections, 
the question is whether the choice not to choose is, in general or in particular contexts, 
likely to go wrong, and in the abstract, there is no reason to think that that particular 
choice would be especially error-prone. In light of people’s tendency to overconfidence, 
the choice not to choose might even be peculiarly likely to be right, which would create 
serious problems for choice-requiring paternalism.
61  
 
Consider in this regard evidence that people spend too much time trying to make 
precisely the right choice, in a way that leads to  significant welfare losses. In many 
situations,  people  underestimate  the  temporal  costs  of  choosing,  and  exaggerate  the 
benefits, producing “systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, 
choice  freedom  on  task  performance  and  task-induced  affect.”
62 If  people  make  such 
systematic  mistakes,  it  stands  to  reason  that  they  might  well  choose  to  choose  in 
circumstances in which they ought not to do so on welfare grounds. 
 
My aim is not to endorse the welfarist rejection of paternalism; it is only to say that 
the underlying arguments apply to all forms of paternalism, including those that would 
interfere  with  the  decision  not  to  choose.  To  be  sure,  some  welfarists  are  willing  to 
interfere  with  people’s  choices;  they  may  well  be  libertarian  or  nonlibertarian 
paternalists.
63 The central points are that the standard welfarist arguments on behalf of 
freedom of choice apply to those who (freely) choose not to choose, and that those who 
want to interfere with such choices might well be paternalists. And from the standpoint of 
autonomy, interference with the choice not to choose seems objectionable as well, unless 
it is fairly urged that that choice counts as some kind of alienation of freedom. 
 
E. Cases 
 
In which cases would it be paternalistic to reject a choice not to choose? Begin 
with (a) above.
64 Suppose that people are subjected to criminal punishment if they do 
not choose (for example to vote or to purchase health care) and that they wish not to 
choose. To know whether paternalism is involved, we need to identify the reason that 
people are being forced to choose. If people face some kind of collective action 
problem, and if coercion is meant to solve that problem, paternalism is not involved. 
But if public officials believe that it is best for people if they choose, and if they are 
punishing people in order to ensure that they do what is best for them, then we have a 
case of paternalism. Everything turns on the reason for the punishment.  
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Whether or not people should be forced to vote or to purchase health care, there is 
a plausible argument that in both contexts, the goal of coercion is to solve a collective 
action problem. But we could easily imagine cases in which people are being forced to 
choose on the ground that it is good for them to do so, even if they think otherwise. 
Some of those who support both compulsory voting and the “individual mandate” for 
health insurance believe exactly that. In the latter context, the idea might be that people 
suffer from inertia
65 or fail to make a choice that will protect them in the event that 
things go unexpectedly wrong. 
 
Now turn to (b), which seems to involve many of the most interesting cases. In 
those cases, some choosers undoubtedly have a second-order preference not to choose, 
and active choosing interferes with or overrides that preference. Nonetheless, choice 
architects are imposing a requirement of active choosing in circumstances in which 
some or many people, faced with the option, would choose not to choose. Is active 
choosing paternalistic for that reason?  
 
As before, the answer turns on why choice architects are insisting on active choice. 
In the case of organ donation, paternalism is not involved. The goal is to protect third 
parties, not choosers.
66 So too with a case in which a choice architect favors a default 
rule that reduces environmental harms; in such cases, third parties are at risk.
67 But 
suppose that as a condition for entering into an employment relationship, people are 
asked or required to make an active choice with respect to their retirement plan; 
suppose too that choice architects believe that it is good for them to do so, even though 
prospective employees disagree (and would prefer to be defaulted). If so, then choice 
architects are acting paternalistically. In such cases, those who insist on active choosing 
are hardly avoiding paternalism; they are engaging in it.  
 
It might seem puzzling to suggest that paternalism might be involved in (c). How 
can it be paternalistic to say that you do not own a pair of shoes, a tablet, an 
automobile, or a fish sandwich unless you have actively chosen it? The question is a 
good one, but it should not be taken as rhetorical; everything depends on the reasons 
that underlie the creation of a particular system of choice architecture.
68 To be sure, 
there are many justifications for free markets and active choosing, and a number of 
them have nothing to do with paternalism. Some of those justifications speak of 
efficiency and others of autonomy. But suppose that we think that active choosing is a 
way to ensure that people develop certain characteristics and tastes. Suppose that the 
idea is that choosers gain independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of initiative, and 
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that a system of active choosing (subject to background entitlements) is desirable for 
exactly that reason. That would be a paternalistic justification. 
 
This view is hardly foreign to those who emphasize the importance of freedom of 
choice; it plays a significant role in Mill’s own defense of liberty.
69 It is also a cousin of 
an early defense of free markets, memorably sketched by Albert Hirschmann, which 
emphasizes that free commerce creates a certain kind of culture, in which traditional 
social antagonisms, based on religion and ethnicity, are softened as people pursue their 
economic interests.
70 For at least some of those who prize active choosing, the concern 
is not softening of social divisions, but the development of engaged, spirited, informed 
people. Those who favor active choosing often embrace a form of liberal perfectionism, 
embodied in the idea that the government legitimately promotes certain desirable 
characteristics, on the ground that it is best for people to have those characteristics.
71 To 
the extent that active choosing promotes independence, self-sufficiency, and a sense of 
initiative, it might be preferred on perfectionist grounds, even if people would choose 
not to choose. 
 
To be sure, it is not exactly standard to see those who embrace free markets as 
favoring any kind of paternalism, and it is often wrong to see them in that way, because 
other justifications are available, and because people often do in fact have a first-order 
desire to choose, certainly in cases that fall in category (c).
72 But suppose that private or 
public institutions favor active choosing, and reject mandates or default rules, because 
they want to influence people for their own good. Recall our working definition, which 
suggests  that  paternalism  is  involved  when  a  private  or  public  institution  does  not 
believe that people’s choices will promote their welfare, and it is taking steps to influence 
or alter people’s choices for their own good. If people have a second-order desire not to 
choose, and if active choosing overrides that choice, then paternalism is indeed involved, 
even in cases that fall in category (c).  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Choice can be either a great benefit, a kind of gift, or instead an immense burden, a 
kind of curse. In evaluating private and public institutions, and people’s diverse attitudes 
toward freedom of choice, it is crucially important to appreciate their frequent desire to 
choose and also their frequent antipathy toward choosing. If either is neglected, there is a 
risk that both low-level policy judgments and high-level theoretical claims will go badly 
wrong. 
 
Many people have insisted on an opposition between active choosing and 
paternalism, but in many contexts, the opposition is illusory, even a logical error. The 
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reason is that some people choose not to choose, or would do so if they were asked. To be 
sure, the power to choose may well have intrinsic value, but people often exercise that 
power by delegating authority to others. Nanny states forbid people from choosing, but 
they also forbid people from choosing not to choose.
73  
 
If choice architects are overriding that particular choice, they may well be acting 
paternalistically — at least if they are motivated by the belief that active choosing is 
good, notwithstanding the fact that people reject that belief. Insistence on active choosing 
may simultaneously reduce people’s welfare and insult their autonomy. The same 
concerns that motivate objections to paternalism in general can be applied to paternalistic 
interferences with people’s choice not to choose. 
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